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Abstract
Devices with a lack of countermeasures, which are defenses put into place to
thwart an assailant, can be subject to physical attacks. These attacks can lead to
the extraction of sensitive information such as keys that are used in cryptographic
operations to secure for example intellectual property. Test Vector Leakage Assess-
ment (TVLA) aims at being able to provide detection of information leakage using
statistical analysis. This work presents multiple implementations of TVLA that aid
in the testing of these systems and countermeasures, which is crucial in keeping
information secure.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In 1999, Paul Kocher, detailed his ability to directly determine power consumption
measurements collected during cryptographic operations [2]. Using this informa-
tion he could obtain information about device operations and potential encryption
and decryption key material. Kocher went on to use various forms of power analy-
sis to determine entire keys and important intermediates. His work spawned new
forms of hardware attack that has now stretched over a decade of new research and
countermeasures. Researchers at Jiao Tong University were able to crack the en-
cryption on 3G and 4G sim cards. Using side-channel analysis, researchers tracked
the power levels of the cards on a oscilloscope [3]. Through analyzing the protocol
and correlating the results through a SIM card reader, their team was able to not
only crack the encryption, but clone SIM cards. This capability allowed for imper-
sonations of accounts such as Alipay, where account funds could be withdrawn
and passwords could be changed. This attack is due to the fact that developers of
the cards were reliant only on software security for these devices and implemented
no hardware countermeasures.
In society today, data and information are fundamental to many factors of life
such as health care, finances, and education. However, devices in these areas of life
are vulnerable to devastating hardware attacks. As described, educated hackers are
3
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more than capable of manipulating these systems to their will. Countermeasures
and protection for these devices must be established and implemented. Thankfully,
there are several forms of countermeasures such as masking data or obfuscating
power consumption signals for confusion. Verifying and making sure these coun-
termeasures are working as intended is essential. One must be able to understand
these attacks in as many ways as possible. Much work must be done in testing
these devices.
One approach to side-channel testing is to perform a side-channel attack on the
device known as Differential Power Analysis (DPA). However, performing such
an attack has it’s drawbacks. One previous work on testing systems and coun-
termeasures for their security shows how statistical analysis of power traces can
determine if ones system is vulnerable to hardware attacks through side-channel
analysis [4].
The goal of this Major Qualifying Project (MQP) is to develop a statistical analy-
sis tool that allows an individual to see if ones system is subject to hardware attacks
such as DPA. In this MQP this was accomplished by first learning more about the
statistics behind such a tool. This learning was done through a literature review.
Subsequently the analysis framework was studied since it is the space where the
tool will live. Following, development began on the tool. Numerous variations of
the tool were made proving its flexibility and use.
The tool is not only capable of detecting if a system is subject to some form of
information leakage, but is also capable of detecting higher moment information
leakage. The tool was tested at various moments with precise data sets to ob-
serve behavior, and behaved as expected. The tool is also able to function despite
moderate to severe environmental noise.
While developing this tool, much understanding was gained on improvements
that could be made to the system. A few recommendations include improved
memory input and output handling, cache detection of alterations made to code,
and improved fragmentation of stored data.
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Overview
This background section provides critical information in respect to security, cryp-
tography, vulnerabilities of current systems, and ways to detect those vulnerabil-
ities. One must understand these concepts and ideas in order to have a proper
understanding of the design, work, and results achieved in this project. This sec-
tion provides a clear path to comprehending the methodology.
2.2 Protecting Information Exchange
When exchanging information, often times such information must be kept secret
between desired parties. This circumstance is especially important in situations
such as when critical intellectual property must be protected, or when there is a
sensitive message that must only be read by a particular individual. In order to
protect this information many cryptographers have devised certain methods that
can provide security.
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2.3 Cryptography
Cryptography has four information security objectives from which all others are
derived. They are the following: confidentiality, which is a service that only allows
those who are authorized to have certain information, data integrity, which disal-
lows the unauthorized tampering or modification of data, authentication, which
allows one to identify individuals as themselves, and non-repudiation, which pre-
vents denial of service [5].
2.3.1 History
First Occurrences
One of the earliest instances of cryptography traces back to 1900 BC where in
Egypt an inscription had been carved into the tomb of a nobleman [6]. Some of the
symbols the scribe used were unusual [7]. Apparently the individual had altered
certain symbols in the message. However, his reasoning was in order to make the
message look more distinguished.
Caesar Cipher
Around 100 BC, during a time of war Julius Ceaser devised a cipher where he
would shift a message’s letters by a certain number, making the message intelligible
[1]. This cipher was one of the tools that aided him in his Civil War against Pompey
enabling him to gain power in Rome. Caesar was known by shifting his letters by
3. Figure 2.1 explains this in more detail.
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Figure 2.1: Caesar Cipher Shifting Mechanism (A Brief History of Cryptography, 2016)
Substitution Cipher
During the 16th century Mary Queen of Scots had the desire to assassinate Queen
Elizabeth I. In order to communicate her intent with her partners, she encrypted
these messages using a substitution cipher. Each letter would be substituted with
a corresponding letter in a "cipher alphabet". Figure 2.2 shows the nomenclature
that Mary Queen of Scots used. However, by this time in history letter frequency
analysis had already been a well-known form of attack.This resulted in Elizabeth
I capturing and cracking these messages. Mary Queen of Scots was tried, found
guilty and and later executed [8].
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Figure 2.2: Mary Queen of Scots Substitution Cipher Nomenclature
Vigenere Cipher
Another important cipher that was devised during the 16th century is the Vigenere
Cipher. This cipher is similar to the Caesar cipher but differs because it shifts each
letter independent of the other. Each letter has a shift of its own rather than all
letters of the message having the same shift. More emphasis is placed on the
actual key than the system. The key repeats multiple times to the length of the
message and provides more security than the Ceasar Cipher. Figure 2.3 uses the
key "CRYPTO" which is repeated over the length of the message m, thus creating
the cipher text c [1].
Figure 2.3: Vigenere Cipher Example [1]
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2.3.2 Modern Applications of Cryptography
In this digital age most devices that individuals interact with on a daily basis
use some form of cryptography. Whether it be the chip and pin system used
by your bank and credit card, or the certificates used to verify the identity of a
website. Figure 2.4 shows several different technologies that in some way all use
cryptography. This fact illustrates just how much this form of security inundates
the typical individual’s life.
Figure 2.4: Devices that use Cryptography
2.3.3 Weaknesses of Early Ciphers
As hinted above early ciphers had many weaknesses. The ciphers above are all
vulnerable to letter frequency analysis. A technique where one uses the most
common letters used in the alphabet to analyze which letters may correspond to
other letters.
The Ceaser Cipher is highly susceptible to a brute force attack one most only try
25 different variations of the message in order to correctly guess it. The Vigenere
Cipher only improves on that to the length of your message. Granting 26n possible
different combinations for your message, where n is the number of characters in
your message. This difference does provide some improvements however with
computers today often times these messages can be deciphered easily.
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2.3.4 Modern Cryptography Systems
In order to protect the devices and information that are used today, stronger forms
of security and cryptography were needed. This led individuals to developing
Symmetric and Public Key Cryptography systems in order to secure information.
The following sections will describe these innovations in cryptography.
Symmetric Algorithms
Symmetric Algorithms are named as such because the same cryptographic key
is used during the encryption and decryption process. This feature can be seen as
an advantage or disadvantage. Since multiple parties will have the same key the
authentication of who sent which message cannot be done. However, often times
as due to the implementation of symmetric algorithms they are much quicker then
asymmetric algorithms. These algorithms are typically used when there is a central
controlling authority such as a government or military. They can live fine with
symmetric protocols if there is an efficient way of agreeeing on keys. The Kerberos
protocol is an example. It can run only with symmetric cryptography and is widely
used for protecting corporate networks [9].
These types of ciphers can be implemented various ways. The two main ways
are as stream ciphers and block ciphers. In block ciphers various bits are encrypted
together and then usually padded to some length. In a stream cipher usually each
byte is encrypted on its own. There are various symmetric key algorithms [10].
The most widely used symmetric algorithm known as the Advanced Encryp-
tion Standard (AES) was created through the 1997-2000 competition and was or-
ganized by the National Institute of Science and Technology. A contender for the
AES competition The algorithm that won Rijndael became known as AES [11]. A
popular algorithm used before AES is the Digital Encryption Standard (DES). It
was later determined to be no longer secure, and now individuals have modified it
and use it in the algorithm Triple DES (3DES). The Rivest Cipher4 is a well known
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cipher known for its use in Transport Layer Security [12].
Public Key Systems
In public key systems also known as asymmetric cryptography, a pair of keys are
used. The two different keys generated are known as the public and the private key.
One is widely available and one must be kept only for an intended individual. In
these systems authentication is available, as only a single individual will typically
have the private key proving they sent a message [13].
In these systems the public and private key can both be used for encryption
and decryption. However, it is important to note that only the private key can
decrypt the public keys encrypted messages, and only the public key can decrypt
the private keys messages.
One popular and intended use of public key systems is authentication this pro-
cess typically consists of hashing a message into a digest. Afterwards encrypting
this output using the private key. In this scheme the message is typically known
and the only need of the protocol at this step is authentication [5]. Exclusively to
public key systems are digital signatures, which is another method of providing
authenticity for a document or message and key exchanges, which allow for secure
transfer of keys used for encryption and decryption.
Popular algorithms are RSA, which stands for the names of its creators Rivest,
Shamir, and Adleman. El Gamal and the Diffie-Hellman are commonly used for
key exchanges. The Digital Signature Standard as its name implies is commonly
used for digital signatures.
2.4 Security Hardware Vulnerabilities
2.4.1 Overview
Cryptographic systems are vulnerable to physical attacks. Attacks through tech-
niques such as DPA make use of the natural characteristics of a device, and are
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possibly vulnerable despite the security that exist in software. These attacks can
be devastating causing weird and unintended behavior in devices or even to the
extent of leaking whole keys, resulting in successful extraction of secret messages.
2.4.2 Side-Channel Analysis
Side-Channel Analysis can occur in most any systems. Side-channel information
is simply unintended information released by a system due to its physical charac-
teristics. An example is of a traditional safe or lock, which releases unintentionally
information on whether a number tried is correct through sound.
Digital systems have certain characteristics which result in side-channel analy-
sis being feasible.This information is released in digital systems in various ways.
It can be released through the power consumed, the heat released, acoustic vibra-
tions, and even the electromagnetic waves it creates. Figure 2.5 shows an example
setup for observing power consumption on a Sasebo-GII FPGA, while performing
a basic AES-128.
Figure 2.5: Example Setup on Sasebo-GII FPGA
Resultingly there are a plethora of different attacks that can be done. On a
system a few notable attacks discovered throughout history are Timing attacks,
Power Consumption Attacks, which stem out into Simple Power Analysis (SPA),
and DPA, or Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) Attacks, also known as Fault Injec-
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tions. These various attacks can even be combined to create devastating results
[14].
Simple Power Analysis
SPA is a basic analysis of the traces produced through observation. In an MQP in
2013 titled Electromagnetic Side-channel Analysis on an Intel Atom Processor, students
were able to perform SPA and even read out the used key from the technique [15].
This technique can be performed on the trace in Figure 2.6. If one knew nothing
about the algorithm being used, using SPA one could see that the trace has 10
repetitive structures in it.
This information hints at the algorithm being used to be AES-128 since it has
10 rounds where the same operations are being done on inputted data. With this
information more advanced techniques can be used to extract even more sensitive
information.
Figure 2.6: AES Trace on Sasebo-GII FPGA
Differential Power Analysis
DPA is a much more powerful attack. This attack can lead to obtaining key infor-
mation about a system. DPA is a statistical method wherein sets of measurements
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to identify data-dependent correlation occur. In a DPA a set of traces is divided
into different subsets. The difference of the averages of these subsets is computed.
The subsets are divided based off of a selection function.The selection function
is typically determined based off of an educated guess as to a possible intermediate
state in the system. If the outputted vector shows a significant spike a cryptanalyst
knows the selection function output is correlated to a value operated on by the
device under test (DUT).
Fault Injection
This type of attack is involved with changing the different characteristics of a sys-
tem. Such as changing the power supplied to a device, or messing with the clock of
a device [14]. These can cause lines of code to be entirely skipped. Fault injection
is a manipulation of the internal state of a device by adding some type of outside
factor or change.
2.5 Detecting Vulnerabilities
2.5.1 Directed Tests and Attacks
One method of choice used in knowing if a system is secure is performing some
sort of side-channel attack such as DPA on the device. However, this type of
vulnerability detection can prove to be very inefficient as the correct hypothesis
must be made for the selection function. This can lead to false positives, where a
system is thought to be secure but in actuality is vulnerable.
This unknown factor or educated guess that must be made when testing a
system proves to be very difficult to deal with. The complexity of implementing
such designs can prove to be difficult as well. As assumptions must be made
about intermediate states of the device. Repetition of these attacks on a system is
resultingly common, because the correct guess must be made. In order for there
to be a "hit". This repetition is time consuming, which can be an issue in time
2.5. Detecting Vulnerabilities 15
sensitive situations.
This project deals with implementing a system that is able to bypass these
issues creating a tool that tells a user if there system is leaking critical information
and is vulnerable to side-channel attack.
2.5.2 Test Vector Leakage Assessment
A statistical tool, which can be used to detect information leakage in devices is
TVLA. This approach tries to detect if sensitive intermediates have significantly
impacted the measurement data. The null hypothesis of TVLA is that the mean
and variance of the two sets of power traces are the same meaning that the sensitive
intermediates had no impact on them [4]. In this test the Welch’s T-test is used
to determine whether a data set provides enough information to prove the null
hypothesis false. Equation 2.1 below shows Welch’s T-test.
t =
X1 − X2√
s21
N1
+
s22
N2
(2.1)
There are two main categories of detection through TVLA. There is general and
specific detection. The general case is typically composed of a fixed and random
data set as the inputs to the cryptographic operations. The term fixed is meant to
imply that over the course of the collection of the traces, these fixed traces were
derived using an unchanging data set. This unchanging data set underwent the
encryption process where the traces were collected. The term random implies a
similar meaning. The difference is that these random traces were derived from a
randomly changing data set.
The goal of this general fixed vs. random test is to detect if there is any leakage
depending on the input data or key. Keeping one data set fixed and randomly
generating the other allows one to achieve this goal. A general test showing leak-
age however, does not necessarily guarantee a key attack. It only indicates the
possibility of an attack [4].
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A specific test usually is targeting an intermediate in a cryptographic algo-
rithm. This intermediate could be an attack point for determining a key. Typical
intermediates are s-box outputs, round outputs, or the XOR during a round input
or output. This test can be achieved using a random vs. random data set. These
data sets ensure that there is no leakage depending on the input data.
2.5.3 Welch’s T-test
The goal of this t-test is to determine whether two samples have the same mean.
This t-test is based off of the Student’s T-test, created by William Gosset [16]. This
test is used to detect how different two sets are from each other. In figure 2.7
describing Welch’s T-test X refers to the mean of a distribution. In the numerator
the mean of the two distributions are being differenced. In the denominator the
s2 refers to the variance of a distribution as variance is the standard deviation
squared. The variance of a distribution is being divided by the total number of
samples in that set N, and then being added to the equivalent value for the other
set.
2.5.4 Matched Pairs Test Vector Leakage Assessment
A variation on TVLA, allows for results to be correctly portrayed despite a good
amount of environmental change or fluctuations. In the classical TVLA these en-
vironmental factors strongly effect the mean and variance of the two sets of power
traces, and attribute greatly to them making it seem as though a system is se-
cure, when it is actually vulnerable. Matched Pairs TVLA allows one to detect the
differences in mean and variance despite these factors.
In this implementation each trace in a group is given a pair in the other group.
Once collected a difference on them is done with their pair, the resultingly set
of traces is known as the difference. A paired form of the Welch’s t-test is then
performed on the mean and variance of the set of traces. Equation 2.2 shows this
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paired Welch’s t-test [17].
tp =
D√
s2
N
(2.2)
2.5.5 Countermeasures
There are three popular types of countermeasures that can be implemented in a
system to defend against side-channel attack. These countermeasures perform best
in combination with each other. They are known as hiding, masking, and leakage
resilience. The following paragraphs are dedicated to explaining and providing
insight into these countermeasures.
Hiding
This type of countermeasure tries to make it difficult to measure leakage by gener-
ating points of known leakage with some form of noise. Other than noise one can
try using shielding which consists of putting metal shielding around components
to prevent detection of certain electromagnetic emissions. One can also try to use
dummy insertions, which entails adding in blocks of code that do not have to do
with sensitive information [14]
The downfall to hiding however, is that often times if physical access to the de-
vice is granted shielding can be removed, as well for noise and dummy operations
adding more traces to the attack can overcome them.
Leakage Resiliency
A common form of leakage resiliency is key cycling. This process entails frequently
changing the key to deterministic values. The same key value is only used for a
certain amount of time to reduce the number of traces obtained.
An implementations can include changing the cryptographic protocol for a sys-
tem, not being able to be performed backwards, and the performance of the device
being severely impacted. These facets of an implementation only add to its diffi-
culty.
18 Chapter 2. Background
Masking
In masking the goal is to break the statistical significance of the algorithm from
the values processed on in the algorithm such as the key or plain text. One can
split the sensitive information into two shares for example. Operations are then
performed on the shares individually. These implementations however are subject
to higher order attacks [18].
2.5.6 Statistical Moments
In statistics, a data set has certain characteristics unique to it. These characteristics
can be seen in the shape of the Probability Density Function (PDF) of the data set.
The mean of the data set is known as the first moment. The mean is calculated
by summing the data set, and dividing it by the number of values in the set. The
variance of the data set is known as the second central moment. The variance is
calculated by taking the difference from the mean for each sample in the set and
squaring that value. The squared value for each sample is then summed for all
values in the set and divided by the total number of values in the set. Equation 2.3
portrays the variance calculation.
variance = ∑
(xi − x¯)2
n
(2.3)
For higher order moments the central or standardized moment are typically
used as they do not affect the location of the distribution in the PDF. They only
affect its shape and spread [19].
The third standardized moment is the skewness and it is seen through the
lopsidedness of the PDF, whether it is more dense on one side then the other. The
fourth standardized moment is the kurtosis. The kurtosis is seen by the shape of
the tails at each side of the PDF.
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2.5.7 Higher Moment Test Vector Leakage Assessment
Higher moment TVLA can be used to detect leakages despite masking using mul-
tiple shares. Higher moment TVLA is achieved by taking into account the mean of
the groups of traces. One also must raise each trace to the power of whatever order
is desired. Using the center product for the calculation of the higher orders can
reduce computation complexity thus improving efficiency and speed. Equation 2.4
is an equation explaining how this might be implemented [17].
D =
[
(LA − L¯A)d − (LB − L¯B)d
]
(2.4)
2.5.8 T-private
A t-private design provides circuit level information protection. For a masked
design this protection is achieved by separating the input into t + 1 parts called
shares [20]. T-private circuits are a masking countermeasure, and the more shares
the higher security [21].
2.5.9 Summary
Concluding, the growth of cryptography has been ongoing for thousands of years.
In the onset of technological advancement digital information security has become
a necessity in numerous facets of life. In theory and practice however, systems
have been shown to be devastatingly vulnerable to physical attacks. These attacks
can be combated through countermeasures, but these countermeasures should be
verified and tested with tools such as TVLA.
Chapter 3
Methodology
3.1 Overview
In order to detect potential information leakage in electronic devices, In this work
a tool was created to implement various versions of a TVLA methodology. This
tool provides a statistical vector that yields critical information about the security
of one’s system.
In order to create this tool, existing TVLA designs and implementations were
examined. From these designs, multiple variations of TVLA that would work
within the MITRE side-channel analysis framework were designed. The first phase
included designing and implementing a basic fixed vs. random TVLA system and
a more advanced matched pairs implementation of TVLA. A higher moment test-
ing procedure was designed.
This TVLA system will be used by the MITRE Corporation in future endeavors,
so this system needs to function without mishaps. Phase 2 included testing and
verifying that this system worked without mistake. Various tests were run on the
system for efficiency and performance.
Phase 3 entailed running the system on various existing designs at the MITRE
Corporation, to see how these systems behave under test, and further assess the
20
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TVLA system.
3.2 Phase 1: Design and Implementation
3.2.1 Fixed vs. Random
In various works, a general test to catch potential information leakage was a fixed
vs. random implementation of TVLA. This test was implemented in the MITRE
side-channel framework, through various steps. First a file in json format that
contained required information on the data was created. This file contained such
information as the plain text message, and meta data information. Meta data
information included how many traces there are in total, the key, the type of test
to be run, and whether a trace was a part of the fixed or random data set. Figure
3.1 shows the flow diagram for the stimulus generation file.
Figure 3.1: Flow Diagram for Stimulus Generation
The plain text messages were designed specifically for this implementation. The
first set of plain texts were chosen to be fixed and the second set of plain texts were
chosen to be varying. For both datasets the key was 0x0123456789abcdef123456789abcdef0.
The sets consisted of the following.
• plaintext for dataset1 (fixed): 0x00000000000000000000000000000000 (16 0
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bytes) perform N encryptions where Ij+1 = AES(K,Ij)
• plaintext for dataset2 (random): 0xda39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890 per-
form M encryptions on the same plaintext
This json file is supplied as an input into the generation of traces. Either simu-
lations or hardware captures are run to obtain traces.
After traces are obtained, and stored they are read and processed by python
code. This python code obtains the needed statistical information needed to per-
form TVLA. These traces then went to an analysis script which ran them through
TVLA. This implementation of TVLA consists of reading in the traces, and then
putting them through various processing steps. For basic TVLA the traces that are
part of the fixed and random data set have there mean and variance computed
separately.
After this computation they are run through Welch’s t-test. There are various
intermediate steps that can be computed on these traces as well, such as cropping
to the attack range or adding noise into the traces. Figure 3.2 portrays a simple
design for fixed vs. random TVLA.
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Figure 3.2: Flow Diagram for Basic Fixed vs. Random Matched Pairs
3.2.2 Matched Pairs
The matched pairs TVLA implementation is similar. In the collect step it differs in
the fact that each trace is either matched with the one before or after it. Meaning
that for one there is the same number of fixed and random traces and two the only
thing being changed is whether the fixed trace or random trace will occur first.
An additional step is added to the analysis script. A difference step is added
where the two groups are subtracted by each other, each matched pair is subtracted
resulting in a difference vector. The Welch t-test step is also altered to operate on
this new difference vector.
3.2.3 Higher Moment
The collection process for the higher moment implementation is identical to the
matched pairs implementation. The two major parts that change are the analysis
script and the difference step. The analysis script must now run a step for the
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mean before the difference in order to obtain the two means.
The difference step must now handle higher orders through differencing the
mean of each group from the trace and raising it to some power or performing the
center product to some power before the difference of the two groups.
3.3 Phase 2: Testing and Verification
3.3.1 Unit Testing
In order to verify that the TVLA system was working as desired numerous unit
tests were created. In creating these unit tests the goal was to isolate certain statis-
tical moments using specifically crafted data sets. The first through fourth moment
were tested. Statistical moments were chosen because TVLA is primarily for de-
tecting the differences in these moments between different data sets.
The first of these data sets were to have a difference in the first moment known
as the mean, and no differences in the rest of the moments. The second data set
had differences in the second moment known as the standard deviation and the
fourth moment. The third data set had only a difference in the third moment. The
fourth data set was to only have differences in the fourth moment. The crafting of
these data sets are described in full detail in the results section.
3.4 Phase 3: Application of Test Vector Leakage Assessment
3.4.1 Test Designs
TVLA was run on the traces of several test designs in order to test performance
of these designs and the operation of TVLA. These designs were tested in the first
through fourth moment for information leakage. In order to specify which design
was to be run, the simulation and hardware capture tool, took in an argument into
their corresponding scripts.
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Another performance test on TVLA that was used was a comparison versus
a DPA on the same data set. Matched pairs TVLA for one of the test designs
was compared against the basic TVLA for the same design. The following section
describes these designs.
Simple S-box
This test design entails a simple s-box look-up of a key/value pair applied twice.
There is an internal register holding the input value, first s-box result, and second
s-box result. The input is an 8-bit key, 8-bit data, and control signals. The second
s-box result is output from the design. The inputs are supplied via a control PC,
which randomly generates data with a constant key.
Masked Design
This is a quasi-protected test design. It is the initial design run through an initial
t-private protection. For this protection t=1, meaning that each input bit should
have one corresponding mask input bit. Random mask inputs are fed from the
control PC along with the data and key.
Toggle-protected Design
This is as well the initial design, however now it is run through a second t-private
protection. In an attempt to deal with leakage seen in the quasi-protected design,
double the masks were used in this design. Since the t-private circuit is the same
and only the mask control changed, it is essentially toggling between two sets of
masks.
Chapter 4
Results
4.1 Overview
In order to determine the use and efficiency of the tool created during this MQP,
multiple tests were run on the system. This section shows the results of these
tests. Four main tests were focused on for this system. These tests determine the
usability and effectiveness of this tool.
The first of these tests consisted of composing various data sets and observing
how the t-statistic behaved at an increasing amount of traces and several moments.
The second of these tests compared the output of the TVLA system with the output
of a DPA being run on the same data set.
The next test was used to view how TVLA runs in terms of the several designs
at MITRE. The designs under test were a simple AES s-box design, A masked
design, and a toggle protected design. The various tests ran on this system showed
the performance of this tool under certain circumstances.
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4.2 Test Vector Leakage Assessment Unittesting
4.2.1 Overview
For this test numerous data sets were composed, which were used to test the de-
tection capability of TVLA at several moments. The first through fourth moment
were under test.
4.2.2 Crafting Datasets
Mean
The first moment which is also known as the mean was tested by having a single
data set and adding an offset of 1 to the whole data set. This would keep the
second through fourth moment the same resulting in only a change in the mean or
1st moment. This data set was composed by having for example all even numbers
from 0 to N then adding one to that data set thus having all odd numbers from
1 to N+1. The following figure shows a generalization of how the Probability
Distribution Function for these two data sets look.
Figure 4.1: Mean Data Set
Standard Deviation
The second moment is the standard deviation. In order to test this data set a
data set of zero mean and skewness was composed. This caused the first and
28 Chapter 4. Results
second moment to be zero. The distribution can also be described as -N to N set,
resultingly being of 2N size in total. In most practical cases if there is a difference
in the second moment there will always be a difference in the fourth moment.
Resultingly this test shows a difference in both moments. Figure 4.2 portrays the
PDF of the data set.
Figure 4.2: Standard Deviation Data Set
Third Moment
The third moment is used to help determine skewness. Resultingly in this data set
to obtain a difference in the third moment but the same in all others. A data set
with the shape of a ramp and a mean of zero was created. The second database
is multiplied by -1 which causes the standard deviation and fourth moment to
remain unchanged.
This data was composed by having a distribution from -N to N, then adding a
value of −N− 1. In order to maintain the zero mean and add skewness resultingly
a positive values are added to offset the −N − 1 values influence. This maintains
the zero mean while adding a positive skew. In order to increase skewness further
this data set is duplicated in the same vector. An ideal portrayal of this data sets
PDF is shown in Figure 4.3.
4.2. Test Vector Leakage Assessment Unittesting 29
Figure 4.3: 3rd Moment Data Sets
In order to actually verify the skewness of the data set however, the PDF of the
data set was plotted in python. The following figure shows this PDF and the PDF
of all the values in the set multiplied by -1.
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Figure 4.4: 3rd Moment Data Set PDF
Fourth Moment
The fourth moment is used to compute kurtosis. In order to obtain a data set
with the same mean, standard deviation, and third moment. A zero mean, zero
skewness data set was created. Following this the standard deviation of the data
set is computed. The negative and positive standard deviation is then repeated to
the size of the first data set creating a data set with only noticeable differences in
the fourth moment. Figure 4.5 portrays these data sets.
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Figure 4.5: 4th Moment Data Set
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4.2.3 Unit Test Results
Figure 4.6: T-statistic Result for Unit Tests at first-fourth order
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Figure 4.6 shows the t-statistic result along the first through fourth moment for
the 4 different data sets. Along the diagonal of the figure a difference in the data
sets are detected for the desired moment.
As stated before the second data set also has differences in the fourth moment
and that is seen as well. The plots along the diagonal of the figure as well all rise
above the 4.5 confidence value of the t-statistic.
TVLA accurately detects a difference at a particular moment for the data set.
This means that it is able to see if two subsets are from the same distribution. This
test proves TVLA’s ability to detect if a system is subject to side-channel analysis.
4.3 Test Vector Leakage Assessment Case Study
4.3.1 Overview
The purpose of this section is to portray the effectiveness of TVLA on detecting
potential information leakage on specific designs. In this section the designs under
test are a simple s-box design, a t-private masked, and a t-private toggle design.
These designs were tested along the first 4 moments.
Simple S-box
The first design under test is the simple s-box implementation. The input is run
through a s-box transformation. Figure 4.7 shows the t-statistic result across all 4
moments.
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Figure 4.7: T-statistic for Simple S-box Design
As one can see and as expected there is leakage across all 4 moments, with
significantly more leakage across the second-fourth moment.
T-private Masked
The second design under test is the t-private masked s-box implementation. Figure
4.8 shows the t-statistic result across all 4 moments.
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Figure 4.8: T-statistic for T-private Masked Design
This design is only quasi-protected, resultingly it still has first order leakages
attributed to it. It also has no higher moment protection put into place thus the
leakage at higher orders.
T-private Toggle
The third design under test is the t-private toggle s-box implementation. Figure
4.9 shows the t-statistic result across all 4 moments.
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Figure 4.9: T-statistic for T-private Toggle Design
This design as well still has first order leakages attributed to it. It also has no
higher moment protection put into place thus the leakage at higher orders.
4.4 Test Vector Leakage Assessment vs. Differential Power
Analysis
4.4.1 Overview
In order to determine the efficiency of TVLA, the traditional DPA and TVLA were
compared against each other.A simple s-box, t-private masked, and t-private tog-
gle protected design were compared against each other. Figure 4.10 shows the
comparison between these two different analysis techniques.
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Figure 4.10: TVLA vs. DPA Results
For all three designs the TVLA shows the t-statistics beyond the 4.5 metric. The
DPA as well shows a hit for all three designs. The TVLA test however, provides
more information as for example in the TVLA Toggle Design it seems as though
the TVLA is hinting at there being a bit of information leakage at each toggle of a
mask. Another improvement this TVLA system provides is higher moment leakage
detection as shown in the previous case study section. As seen above currently all
designs show higher moment information leakage.
4.5 Basic vs. Matched Pairs Test Vector Leakage Assessment
4.5.1 Description
This test was done in order to show the performance of the matched pairs TVLA
under environmental fluctuations compared to the basic TVLA. In order to perform
this test a script that ran the basic TVLA and matched pairs TVLA implementation
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at various noise levels was created. This resulted in numerous vectors representing
t-statistic values. However, the only concern was seeing the difference in perfor-
mance between these two systems. The traces were reduced to a single point in
time where leakage was known to occur. In this case it was during the second
clock cycle.
A gauge of noise in the lab was desired. In order to accomplish this task a
significance value was derived. Through this significance value the change due to
environmental fluctuations could be obtained.
4.5.2 Deriving Significance
In determining the lab significance. The equation below was followed.
Signi f icance =
|µa − µp|
σlab
(4.1)
This significance value was calculated for the lab, and used to obtain the noise
level. A basic temperature model was assumed for the cause of the environmental
fluctuation. The µa and µp values represent the varying horizontal means of the
environmental fluctuations across all of the traces. The sigma represent the stan-
dard deviation at a point in time where leakage is known to occur. The second
clock cycle was used.
Environmental Fluctuations
The noise level in the lab is based on an approximation of this significance value.
The below equation shows a complete representation of this environmental fluctu-
ation.
Env.Fluctuations =
Signi f icance ∗ σsim
2
(4.2)
The standard deviation at a point of leakage for the simulation is used in order
to calculate what the difference between the means would be for the DC offset of
simulations should be.This difference is then halved.
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Mean
The horizontal mean across all traces was determined and plotted it in order to
determine the environmental fluctuations for each particular trace. This type of
averaging can be seen as a low pass filter thus obtaining the DC Offset of each
trace.The following figure shows the horizontal average for all traces. Figure 4.11
shows this DC Offset for an unprotected s-box implementation for 200,000 traces.
Figure 4.11: DC Offset for 200,000 Traces
Since the environmental fluctuations seem sinusoidal across all traces, a tem-
perature model was adapted for the environmental fluctuations. The means of
the environmental fluctuations during the day and the night was desired in order
to calculate how significant lab noise was. A 20,000 trace range was chosen for
obtaining these means. In Figure 4.11 the yellow circle represents the subset of
DC offsets used when obtaining the day mean and the green circle represents the
subsets of DC offsets used when obtaining the night mean.
40 Chapter 4. Results
Standard Deviation
In calculating the lab standard deviation, a time of leakage must be chosen for the
set of traces. A reference trace was plotted to determine this time. Figure 4.12
shows this plot.
Figure 4.12: Reference Trace
When viewing this trace it is incredibly difficult to detect where the second
clock cycle may be. In order to make viewing easier the mean across all traces was
computed, which resulted in a much clearer image. The window size was cropped
to the corresponding attack window. Figure 4.13 shows the plotted average vector.
The vertical line corresponds to the second clock cycle.
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Figure 4.13: Averaged Reference Trace over entire Set of Traces
The standard deviation across all the traces at this point is computed. The
same is done for simulation data. However, a reference trace in simulation showed
a much clearer picture of where the second clock cycle is. Below is a plot of a
reference trace. The second clock cycle is seen to be around array index 260.
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Figure 4.14: Simulated Reference Trace
4.5.3 Generating T-statistic
In order to generate the t-statistic environmental fluctuations resembling that in
the lab were added. The simulations would only be 10,000 traces compared to the
lab captures which were 200,000 traces. A different DC Offset was added to each
trace and made it so that the offset changed in relation to a sinusoid with a similar
period as the sinusoid shown in the DC offset graph. The DC offset resultingly
changed slowly over the number of measurements. The following graph is a plot
of the dc offset of these simulated traces at various noise values.
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Figure 4.15: Horizontal Mean at Various Fluctuations
The range decided on consisted of A = 1E− 7 to 1. A is representative of the
magnitude of change. It is simply a multiplier or the amplitude of the added sinu-
soid.Noise was added to both the matched pairs and the basic TVLA implemen-
tation. Figure 4.15 shows the detection performance of these systems at various
noise levels.
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Figure 4.16: T-statistic of Data set at the second clock cycle
Figure 4.16 shows the t-statistic at the second clock cycle. A clock cycle where
leakage is known to occur. As one can see the paired t-statistic in blue is able to
detect leakage at higher noise levels showing its resistance to greater noise lev-
els. The dashed vertical line shows the approximated value for lab environmental
change. The difference is about 3 orders of magnitude which proves the matched
pairs implementation increased ability over the basic TVLA implementation. One
resultingly sees that as well a strong noise would be needed for the matched pairs
TVLA implementation to realize its full potential.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Test Vector Leakage Assessment Tool
The goal of this MQP was to develop a Test Vector Leakage Assessment system
that allowed an individual to test a device and or its countermeasures for effi-
ciency. This system needed to be able to function within the MITRE side-channel
framework. The design and implementation needed to be well documented and
reviewed thoroughly by MITRE staff. This was achieved through presentations on
the code architecture, algorithms used. The tool was successfully constructed and
tested thoroughly for performance and efficiency.
5.2 Outcomes
Through this tool one is able to see if ones system is leaking information. In order
to make sure the tool is functioning properly numerous tests were run on it and the
results of these tests were documented. The first test ran was in order to see if the
tool was able to detect differences between distributions with different statistical
moments.
If it was able to detect this difference then it could detect this difference in
two differing datasets that should have the same or close distributions during an
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encryption run on a device, but differ due to the effect of input data and the key
on power consumption.
The second of these tests were on specific designs, which were a simple s-box
design, a t-private masked design, and a t-private toggle design. These designs
were run through the TVLA tool at the 1st through 4th moments, and outputted a
t-statistic, which shows whether or not information leakage is occurring.
The third of these tests compared a DPA output against the TVLA output at
the first moment. This comparison was in order to view the performance of TVLA
against the traditional DPA.
The fourth test compares TVLA against a matched pairs implementation. This
comparison is done as the matched pairs implementation is able to show leak-
age on a system despite great amounts of environmental fluctuations. The results
show that in a first moment TVLA test matched pairs provides a three order of
magnitude improvement over the base TVLA, when noise is introduced into the
system.
5.3 Recommendations
Over the course of this project various concerns in the flow of the system that could
use improvement were identified. This section documents a few of these issues.
5.3.1 Memory Management
Memory I/O
A reoccurring issue was with memory I/O. Often times when storing large quan-
tities of data a t-statistic value can produce an erroneous value. Producing an
erroneous value is extremely troubling as it may say that your system is safe even
though, it is vulnerable to devastating attacks. Thankfully, this error can be pre-
vented by clearing directories between runs of the system and spreading out data
in several directories, but this issue should be dealt with in the future.
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Fragmentation of Data
This issue derives from the fact that currently data is all stored in a given direc-
tory. However, directories have a max amount of files that can be stored in them,
and on long runs these directories can reach extremely large sizes, causing access
slow downs. If possible the system should enforce separtion of data into several
directories.
5.3.2 Cache Detection
Currently if there is a change to a functional block known as a "step", and the
system is rerun. The previously cached value will be retrieved even though the
step might process the data in a new way. If possible the system should detect
that these steps have changed and rerun the system instead of retrieving outdated
cached values.
5.3.3 Profiling
Often times, the system takes much time in simply starting. The system if run nu-
merous times in a single script may take a while to run. The system also currently
does not have any profiling established into it. One does not know where time is
being spent. It would be great to add profiling data into the system to be able to
see this in potentially mitigate long run time.
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